Friday, October 31, 2014

case digest



ART.3 SEC. 1.RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY

G.R. No. 162994

Duncan Association Of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro A. Tecson, petitioner
vs.  Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., respondent

September 19, 2005


FACTS:
            Petitioner Pedro Tecson was hired on Oct. 25, 1995 by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. as a medical representative. He was assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. Upon his employment, Tecson signed an employment contract, wherein he agreed, among others, to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies; and if management  found that such relationship posed a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
     On September, 1998 Tecson married Bettsy, an employee of a rival pharmaceutical firm Astra Pharmaceuticals as the branch coordinator. The relationship, including the subsequent marriage, dismayed  Glaxo. On January 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy had given rise to a conflict of interest. Negotiations ensued, with Tecson adverting to his wife's possible resignation from Astra, and Glaxo making it known that they preferred to retain his services owing to his good performance. Yet no resolution came to pass. In September 1999, Tecson applied for a transfer to Glaxo's milk division, but his application was denied in view of Glaxo's "least-movement-possible" policy. Then in November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied. Tecson sought Glaxo’s reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the matter to Glaxo’s Grievance Committee. Glaxo, however, remained firm in its decision and gave Tescon until February 7, 2000 to comply with the transfer order. Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
             On Nov. 15, 2000, the Nat’l. Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo’s policy was valid. Glaxo's policy on relationships between its employees and persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo's right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory. This decision was assailed by petitioners before the Court of Appeals and the Court, but for nothing.


ISSUE:
1)Whether or Not Glaxo’s  policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution;
(2) Whether Tecson was constructively dismissed.


                                                                                RULING:
                The record shows that Tecson was cognizant about the policy imposed by  Glaxo company, upon signing the contract, he voluntarily set his hands to follow the said policies. Albeit employees are free to cultivate relationships w/ and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships.  After Tecson married Bettsy, Glaxo gave him time to resolve the conflict . Glaxo even expressed its desire to retain Tecson in its employ because of his satisfactory performance and suggested that his wife would be the one to resign instead.  Glaxo likewise acceded to his repeated requests for more time to resolve the conflict of interest. When the problem could not be resolved after several years of waiting, Glaxo was constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales area different from that handled by his wife for Astra.  Notably, the Court did not terminate Tecson from employment but only reassigned him to another area where his home province, Agusan del Sur, was included.  In effecting Tecson’s transfer, Glaxo even considered the welfare of Tecson’s family.  Clearly, the foregoing dispels any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the part of Glaxo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.




SEC. 4.FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY & TO PETITION THE GOVT.

G.R. Nos. 123562-65
LEONORA A. GESITE, FE LAMOSTE, ADELAIDA MACALINDOG, and GUIA C. AGATON, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents
November 25, 2004
FACTS:
On September 17, 1990, a regular school day, about 800 teachers in Metro Manila had a mass action, assembled in front of the DECS offices to air their grievances and did not held classes. DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño, brushed aside their complaints, warning them they would lose their jobs for taking illegal mass actions.  He then ordered the teachers to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours, otherwise they will be dismissed from the service, directed the DECS officials to initiate immediate administrative proceedings against those found disobedient.
Petitioners Gesite, Lamoste, Macalindog and Agaton were included  to those who did not report for work on September 19-21, 1990.  Hence, the DECS Secretary filed administrative complaints against them for defying his return-to-work order.  They were charged with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law and Regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and absence without official leave.
Despite receipt of notice to file their answer within seventy-two (72) hours but not more than five (5) days, petitioners failed to do so.  Consequently, they were deemed to have waived their right to controvert the charges.  They were found guilty as charged and ordered dismissed from the service.  Subsequently, this penalty was reduced to nine (9) months suspension for petitioners Adelaida Macalindong and Guia Agaton and six (6) months suspension for petitioners Leonora Gesite and Fe Lamoste.
Petitioners  appealed to the Merit System Protection Board, but it was denied. On appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the same was also denied for lack of merit. They are found liable for “conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service” on the ground that they “acted without due regard to the adverse consequences of their action which necessarily resulted in the suspension and stoppage of classes, to the prejudice of the pupils/students to whom (they) were responsible.” The CSC imposed upon them the penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay. Their respective motions for reconsideration were denied.


ISSUE:
                 Whether or Not the mass action launched by the Public school teachers from Sept. up to the first half of Oct. constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from performing the duty as teachers due to economic reasons is valid.

RULING:
            The issue in joining the mass actions, failed to hold classes to the prejudice of their students while the petitioners have the right to assemble peaceably to air their grievances, however they should have exercised such right in a lawful manner.It is undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners’ purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their services.
Despite the constitutional right to form associations under the Constitution, employees in the public service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass actions that will lead to temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of government employees to organize is limited to the formations of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike. (Bangalisan vs. CA, 276 SCRA 619)
The petitioners are not therefore entitled to their salaries during their suspension because the general proposition is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he had not rendered any service.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.



   
  

SEC. 6.THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
A.M. No. P-11-2999
 SHEILA G. DEL ROSARIO, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, RTC, BRANCH 36, SANTIAGO CITY, ISABELA, complainant, vs. MARY ANNE C. PASCUA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, SAME COURT, respondent.
February 27, 2012
FACTS:
          Respondent Mary Anne Pascua traveled to Hong Kong on 1 to 6 June 2008 during her leave of absence without securing a travel authority from the Supreme Court and that she omitted to state her intended foreign travel in her leave application.  Complainant charged also respondent of dishonesty for misrepresenting her date of birth as 27 June 1974 in her official documents, when her registered date of birth in the National Statistics Office is 7 August 1974.
            Respondent maintained that she failed to secure a travel authority from the Supreme Court due to inefficiency. Respondent assumed that since she did not have custody of and is not accountable for government funds, then she is not required to secure a clearance from the Office of the Court Administrator before she can travel abroad. On the discrepancy in her date of birth, respondent claimed that she is in the process of correcting her Certificate of Live Birth to reflect her true date of birth which is 7 August 1974.
ISSUE:
            Whether or Not a government employee unauthorized foreign travel  during her l
leave of absence is unconstitutional.

RULING:
          Undeniably  that the use of leave of absence can be regulated without impairing the employees’ right to privacy and to travel. It can only be impaired upon lawful order of the court and the interest of national security, public safety, health is at stake and as maybe provided by law. In promulgation of the Civil Service Commission the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, of which Rule XVI is the Omnibus Rules on Leave. Such rules and regulations are adopted to balance the well-being and benefit of the government employees and the efficiency and productivity in the government service. Thus, the requirement of securing approval for any leave of absence is a reasonable and valid regulation to insure continuity of service in the government. However, once a leave of absence is approved, any restriction during the approved leave on the right to travel of the government employee violates his or her constitutional right to travel.
             The administrative complaint against Mary Anne C. Pascua is therefore DISMISSED.


sec.12.Rights of an accused under custodial investigation
G.R. No. 112262.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ CAMAT and WILFREDO TANYAG DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellants
April 2, 1996

FACTS:
            On September 1, 1985 at about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Nelson Sinoy and
Gonzalo Penalver, both members of the Philippine Marine(s) stationed at Fort Bonifacio,
Makati, Metro Manila, were walking along Quirino Avenue, Paranaque, Metro Manila
Were followed by two men, one of them, Wilfredo del Rosario rushed to Nelson Sinoy,
kicked the latter. Armando Camat followed del Rosario and pulled out a knife and
stabbed Nelson Sinoy. Gonzalo Penalver kicked Camat who in turn stabbed the former,
hitting him at the right rib. When Penalver kicked Camat he became outbalanced.
Wilfredo del Rosario then grabbed the clutch bag from him (Penalver).
            Realizing they were at the losing end, Sinoy and Penalver ran away. With the aid  
Of somebody who identified himself as a policeman, they were brought to the San Juan
de Dios Hospital.
Nelson Sinoy died at the San Juan de Dios Hospital.Gonzalo Penalver was transferred to the AFP Medical Center on September 2, 1985. The patient was discharged from the hospital only on March 15, 1986.
In traversing the criminal charge, appellants interposed the defense of alibi and denied any participation in the commission of the felony.
Patrolman Odeo Cariño, to whom the case was assigned for investigation on September 2, 1985, stated based on the testimony of the unidentified witness and since Camat fitted the description  of the murdere given. Prior to the incident, he was arrested by the police officers due to act of lasciviousness. Carino directly said that appellant Camat orally admitted to him his  participation in the killing of the soldier during interrogation at the police precinct. In addition, Camat also allegedly gave the names of Wilfredo del Rosario and one Roland as his co-conspirators in the crime charged, and alluded to appellant Del Rosario as the one who actually stabbed Sinoy.


ISSUE:
1)Whether or Not the the extrajudicial confession of accused violates his rights          under custodial investigation.
2) Is the testimony of a single witness is given much weight and sufficient                  enough to convict?

RULING:

In the absence of the appellants  duly advised of the mandatory guarantees under the Bill of Rights, their confessions made before Patrolman Cariño are inadmissible against them and cannot be used in support of their conviction.
Trial courts should further keep in mind that even if the confession of the accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.
However, even disregarding the extrajudicial confessions of appellants, the judgment of conviction rendered by the lower court stands and can be sustained. Worthy of consideration It is well settled that the testimony of a single eyewitness, if found convincing, sufficient and trustworthy by the trial court and the prosecution has satisfactorily proved the guilt of both accused beyond reasonable boubt.
 WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modifications that appellants are declared guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide, and the civil indemnity for the death of Nelson Sinoy is hereby increased to P50,000.00 in consonance with the present jurisprudential policy.



SEC.1. RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
G.R. NO. 172538

ISABELO ESPERIDA, LORENZO HIPOLITO, and ROMEO DE BELEN, petitioners vs. FRANCO K. JURADO, respondent
April 25, 2012

FACTS:
 On February 5, 2001, petitioners Isabelo Esperida, Lorenzo Hipolito, and Romeo de Belen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent Franco K. Jurado, Jr. before the Labor Arbiter. 
On March 14, 2002, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decisionin favor of petitioners, declaring that they have been illegally dismissed and awarding them their corresponding backwages and separation pay.  Respondent appealed the decision before the National Labor Relations Commission but the latter issued a resolution dismissing the appeal and affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter in toto.
On December 13, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed Resolution of the NLRC. pespondent then filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which was eventually denied in the Resolution on September 27, 2005.
However, during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, or on July 21, 2005, respondent filed before the CA a Petition to declare petitioners in Contempt of Court against the petitioners.  In the said petition, respondent sought to declare herein petitioners guilty of indirect contempt of court on the basis of their alleged acts of dishonesty, fraud, and falsification of documents to mislead the CA to rule in their favor.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the CA issued a Resolution  ordering herein petitioners to file their Answer within 15 days from notice, showing cause why they should not be adjudged guilty of indirect contempt of court.
On February 8, 2006, counsel for petitioners filed his entry of appearance, together with a motion for extension of time, seeking that petitioners be granted 15 days from February 3, 2006, or up to February 18, 2006, within which to submit their Answer to the petition.
On March 2, 2006, the CA issued one of the assailed resolutions denying the motion for extension due to the delay and contained no explanation upon failure of filing it personally.
Hence, the petitioners  motions for extentions due to the reasons of counsel’s workload and failed to give instructions to his liaison officer to mail the motion and the distance is impossible for personal service. Again, through the counsel, prayed the resolution be set aside.
On April 19, 2006, the CA issued the other assailed Resolution, denying both the Omnibus Motion and Second Motion for Extension for lack of merit.
In denying the motions, the CA ratiocinated that petitioners did not file their answer within the reglementary period and clearly disregarded the rules of procedure. petitioners’ plea for liberality is, therefore, undeserving of any sympathy.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the the Court of appeals erred in considering the case submitted for decision without giving petitioners their inherent and inalienable right to due process of law.
RULING:
 The Court of Appeals erred in considering the case deemed submitted for resolution without the answer of petitioners and without setting and conducting a hearing on a fixed date and time on which petitioners may personally, or through counsel, answer the charges against them.
The contempt case against petitioners is still in the early stage of the proceedings.  The proceedings have not reached that stage wherein the court below has set a hearing to provide petitioners with the opportunity to state their defenses.  Certainly, a hearing affords the contemner the opportunity to adduce before the court documentary or testimonial evidence in his behalf. The hearing will also allow the court a more thorough evaluation of the defense of the contemner, including the chance to observe the accused present his side in open court and subject his defense to interrogation from the complainants or the court itself. In fine, the proper procedure must be observed and petitioners must be afforded full and real opportunity to be heard.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE The Court of Appeals is ORDERED to admit petitioners’ Answer.
The case shall not be deemed submitted for resolution until a hearing is conducted in accordance with the Rules.  The Court of Appeals is directed to resume the proceedings below with dispatch.











Thursday, October 30, 2014

lazo report




FRANCISCO YAP, JR., a.k.a. EDWIN YAP, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 141529.  June 6, 2001]

FACTS:
     The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence and travel abroad.
For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, “in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years.” He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings.  The motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated February 17, 1999.
A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed by respondent court, but was denied in a resolution issued on November 25, 1999.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He challenges the legal basis of respondent court for fixing bail at P5,500,000.00, which is equivalent to the amount of his civil liability to private complainant Manila Mahogany Marketing Corporation, and argues that the Rules of Court never intended for the civil liability of the accused to be a guideline or basis for determining the amount of bail.  He prays that bail be reduced to at least P40,000.00, citing the maximum amount of bail that can be posted for the crime of estafa under the 1996 Bail Bond Guide, or P20,000.00, equivalent to the amount of bail he posted during the trial of the case.

ISSUE:   Whether or not the condition imposed by the CA on accused’s bail bond violative the liberty of abode and right to travel?

RULING:
     No. Petitioner is seeking bail on appeal.  He was in fact declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC, and due to the serious amount of fraud involved, sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years --- the maximum penalty for estafa by false pretenses or fraudulent acts allowed by the Revised Penal Code. Although it cannot be controverted that the Court of Appeals, despite the foregoing considerations and the possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to grant petitioner bail, the setting of bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 is unjustified as having no legal nor factual basis.  Guided by the penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the evidence against petitioner, we believe that the amount of P200,000.00 is more reasonable.
The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not absolute rights. 
The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so.



[G.R. No. 16480. December 11, 1920. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
 v.
AGAPITO BELTRAN and PEDRO DE LEON,Defendants. AGAPITO BELTRAN, Appellant.
Facts:
On May 10, 1919, Agapito Beltran borrowed from Facundo Ilaw, the owner of a chineleria, the sum of P74.50. At the same time, Beltran signed a receipt of the following tenor:
"I borrowed from Mr. Facundo Ilaw the sum of seventy-four pesos and fifty centavos (P74.50), by virtue of our agreement that I shall work while I have not paid, and that I shall pay every week by installment.”
Beltran worked continuously in Ilaw’s shop from March 17, 1919, until August 3p, 1919. During this period Beltran claims that he paid Ilaw P24 on account of his debt. Beltran left the employ of Ilaw because of a disagreement with the wife of his employer and because there was not enough work and material to keep him busy.
For failure to fulfill his agreement, Agapito Beltran was prosecuted, first in the municipal court of the city of Manila, and later, on appeal, in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, for a violation of section 1 of Act No. 2098, an Act relating to contracts of personal services and advances thereunder, and providing punishment for certain offenses connected therewith. He was found guilty and was sentenced by the latter court to two months’ imprisonment, to pay Facundo Ilaw the sum of P83.65, and to pay one-half of the costs.
Beltran appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
            Whether or not Beltran violated Act No. 2098, an Act relating to contracts of personal services and advances?
Ruling:
            No, there was no violation on the side of Beltran.
            "The ingredients of this statutory offense are: (1) A contract in writing by the accused for the performance of any act or service; (2) an intent of the part of the accused, when he entered into the contract, to injure or defraud his employer; (3) the obtaining by the accused of money or other personal property from such employer by means of such contract entered into with such intent; and (4) the refusal by the accused, with like intent, and without just cause, and without refunding such money, or paying for such property, to perform such act or service. This statute by no means provides that a person who has entered into a written contract for the performance of services, under which he has obtained money or other personal property, is punishable as if he had stolen such money or other personal property, upon his refusal to perform the contract, without refunding the money or paying for the property. A mere breach of a contract is not by the statute made a crime. The criminal feature of the transaction is wanting unless the accused entered into the contract with intent to injure or defraud his employer, and unless his refusal to perform was with like intent and without just cause. That there was an intent to injure or defraud the employer, both when the contract was entered into and when the accused refused performance, are facts which must be shown by the evidence. As the intent is the design, purpose, resolve, or determination in the mind of the accused, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence, but must be ascertained by means of inferences from the facts and circumstances developed by the proof. (Carlisle v. State, 76 Ala., 75; Mack v. State, 63 Ala., 138.) In the absence, however, of evidence from which such inferences may be drawn, the jury are not justified in indulging in mere unsupported conjectures, speculations, or suspicions as to intentions which were not disclosed by any visible or tangible act, expression, or circumstance. (Green v. State, 68 Ala., 539.)"
Applying the foregoing principles to the facts, we find nothing to show that when the defendant borrowed from the complainant the amount of money mentioned in the receipt, he had made up his mind not to pay his debt, or to injure his employer. If anything, the fact that the accused worked for the complainant continuously for three or four months after the debt was incurred, would indicate good faith on the part of the accused at the time the agreement was signed. In addition to this the testimony of the accused with regard to the reason which compelled him to seek work in another place, appears to be more convincing than that of the complainant on the same point.
Judgment is reversed, and the defendant is acquitted with all costs de officio. So ordered.


IDCPI (Islamic Da’wa Council)
vs.
 Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 153888 July 9, 2003

Facts:
 The office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. Petitioner, lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it, filed a complaint praying to nullify the EO 46 and further implementation of it. The complaint contends that the EO 46 violate the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State. The function of exclusive issuance of halal certificates is only for religious organization – a food becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer.

Issue:
 Whether or not EO 46 is unconstitutional thus, null and void.
Ruling:

Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a religious group. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations thus trangessing the preferred status of the freedom of religion. Interpretation of what food products are fit for Muslim consumption is vested exclusively on the conscience and belieft of one person whether muslim or non-muslim. The protection and promotion of the muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of muslims. Therefore the EO 46 is null and void.



G.R. No. L-63345     January 30, 1986
EFREN C. MONCUPA, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, FABIAN C. VER, GALILEO KINTANAR, FERNANDO GOROSPE, AND JOSE CASTRO, respondents.
Facts:
 Petitioners were arrested and detained on the allegation that they were members of a subversive organization. Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss after the petitioner was temporarily released from detention on the ground that the petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic since the petitioner is free and no longer under the respondent’s custody.
Petitioner argues that his temporary release did not render the instant petition moot and academic because of the restrictions imposed by the respondents which constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.

Issue:
Whether or not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus becomes moot and academic in view of the detained person’s release with restrictions.

Ruling:
No. Restraints attached to temporary release of a detained person warrant the Supreme Court’s inquiry into the nature of the involuntary restraint and relieving him of such restraints as may be illegal.
Reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the detainee’s temporary release constitutes restraints on the liberty of the detainee. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.
Temporary release of detainee from detention with involuntary restraints does not render the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. It is available where a person continue to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are necessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.