Thursday, February 20, 2014

ANSWER TO THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION IN POLITICAL LAW




1. Elma was appointed as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) on 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second appointment, but waived any renumeration that he may receive as CPLC. Question: Is the appointment as CPLC valid? Explain.
ANSWER: The two offices are incompatible. Hence the appointment is unconstitutional. When he accepted the CPLC appointment he is deemed to have abandoned his being Chairman of the PCGG. (PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., LAUREANO T. ANGELES and JOCELYN P. CELESTINO, Petitioners, vs.MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel and as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, and RONALDO ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 138965 March 5, 2007)

2. On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), vice Agustin R. Bengzon. Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006.1
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary. Question: Is the designation of Bautista as OIC of MARINA valid? Explain.

ANSWER: It is not valid. It is an incompatible office. (DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner, vs.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Office of the President, SEC. LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications, USEC. MARIA ELENA H. BAUTISTA, in her official capacities as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications and as Officer-in-Charge of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), Respondents. G.R. No. 184740 , February 11, 2010)

3.What is the power of judicial review? What are its limitations?
ANSWER:The power of judicial review is the power of the Supreme Court to check whether other departments acted beyond their powers or have exercised grave abuse of discretion. The courts’ power of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.20 Respondents assert that the second requisite is absent in this case.

4.What is the meaning of a moot and academic case? Can the Court render a decision when the case has become moot and academic? What are the exceptions to this rule?
ANSWER:A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.24 However, as we held in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma,25 supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public.This is also known as the symbolic function of the Supreme Court. There are exceptions: (a) when the issue is of paramount interest to the nation, (b) when it is capable of evading judicial review.

 5.What is “appointment”? What is “designation”? Distinguish the two by giving at least two examples.
ANSWER: Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.
Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.36

6.In a constitutional government, what must prevail? What is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform? What is the principle of separation of powers? What department of our government is considered as the guardian of the constitution?
Answer: It cannot be overstressed that in a constitutional government such as ours, the rule of law must prevail. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons including the highest official of this land must defer. From this cardinal postulate, it follows that the three branches of government must discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution. Under the principle of separation of powers, neither Congress, the President nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and controversies. The Constitution expressly confers or the judiciary the power to maintain inviolate what it decrees. As the guardian of the Constitution we cannot shirk the duty of seeing to it that the officers in each branch of government do not go beyond their constitutionally allocated boundaries and that the entire Government itself or any of its branches does not violate the basic liberties of the people (CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE MAKALINTAL, LINO M. PATAJO, JOSE LEUTERIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs.HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM, in her capacity as National Treasurer, respondents. G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992)

7. On June 20, 1953, House Bill No. 16297 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals who have rendered at least twenty (20) years service either in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government or in both, having attained the age of seventy (70) years or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. The retired Justice shall receive during the residue of his natural life the salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation. President Aquino, however vetoed House Bill No. 16297 on July 11, 1990 on the ground that according to her "it would erode the very foundation of the Government's collective effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy on standardization of compensation as articulated in Republic Act No. 6758 known as Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." She further said that "the Government should not grant distinct privileges to select group of officials whose retirement benefits under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil service servants." Questions: Is the veto of the president valid? Explain.
Answer: Invalid. The subject veto is not an item veto; The veto by the Executive is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers; The veto deprives the retired Justices of their rights to the pensions due them; The questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution.(Bengzon v. Drilon, supra)

8.  Congressman X is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. He filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
Question: a)Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general?
b) The  "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the contentions that —
1. His reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest — not even the police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without representation.
3. To bar Congressman X from performing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandates entrusted to him by the people.
4. The House treats Congressman X as a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-equal branch of government to respect its mandate.
5. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of Congressman X to discharge his mandate.
Rule on the contentions of Congressman X.
Answer(a) NO. One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo, it is the injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.(B) When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in officeThe performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant. EN BANC G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000)

9. Kishu Dalamal, a British subject, was charged, together with other aliens, with having committed certain irregularities in violation of the Central Bank Rules and Regulations before the Deportation Board in a complaint filed by a Special Prosecutor of the Department of Justice.
Acting on the complaint, the Chairman of the Deportation Board issued a warrant of arrest against Dalamal pursuant to the authority given to said Board by Section 1-(b) of Executive Order No. 398.  Dalamal was accordingly arrested, but he was subsequently released upon filing a bond in the amount of P10,000.00.
Question: Is it within the power of the Chairman of the Deportation Board to issue the warrant of arrest? Explain.

ANSWER: No. The power to issue a warrant of arrest only belongs to the Judicial Members or judges. Whenever, therefore, the President exercises his power of deporting an alien upon prior investigation conducted in the manner and form prescribed in Section 69 of the Administrative Code of 1917, he does so, not only as an act of state, but also "under the combined powers" of the President and the Legislature. As an act of state, the President has the inherent power to order the deportation of an alien and as incident thereof, his arrest, while at the same time that power may be deemed vested in him thru delegation by the Legislature thru the enactment of an appropriate statute (Section 69, Revised Administrative Code.) But insofar as his power to order the arrest of an alien is concerned, either as a measure to insure his appearance at the investigation proceedings to determine if he is liable to deportation, or an incident of his inherent power to deport to make effective his deportation order, assuming only arguendo that he has such incidental power, that power cannot be delegated either under the principle of delegata potesta non potest delegare,1or upon the theory that it is non-delegable because it involves the exercise of judgment or discretion. (KISHU DALAMAL, petitioner, vs.DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent. EN BANC G.R. No. L-16812 ,October 31, 1963)

10. The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .." (See. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit.
Question: Can the Bureau of Printing be sued? Explain.

ANSWER:Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court). Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection (BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and MARIANO LEDESMA, petitioners, vs.THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU), PACIFICO ADVINCULA, ROBERTO MENDOZA, PONCIANO ARGANDA and TEODULO TOLERAN, respondents. EN BANC  G.R. No. L-15751,January 28, 1961)

11. What are the four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system? Explain each parameter.

Answer: To summarize, there are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:
1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives is the maximum number of seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for every four existing legislative districts.
2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two percent of the total party-list votes.
3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the party-list organizations including those that received less than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in a second round of seat allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in the Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution.
4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The well-settled rule is that courts will not question the wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not violative of the Constitution.( BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), Intervenor. G.R. No. 179271 ,July 8, 2009)

12.On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries."Question: Is this ordinance constitutional? Explain your answer.

ANSWER: Not constitutional. A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon. ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs.THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-23794 February 17, 1968

13.           The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, 5 We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation. Question: What are the requirements for a reasonable or valid classification?
ANSWER: A classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.


14. Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the present state of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:
Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Incumbent Elected Official. – Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act,17 which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code18 and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are running,19 an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position without forfeiting his seat.
QUESTION: Are these provisions constitutional? How did the Supreme Court rule on these provisions? Explain.

Answer: All the provisions are constitutional. There is a substantial distinction between elected official and appointive officials, hence they are not treated equally. Thus elective officials are not deemed resigned, while the appointive officials are deemed resigned.
(ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010)

15. . In a speech delivered before the House of Representatives, Congressman X,  said: “The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your unpopular administration the free things they used to get from the government are now for sale at premium prices. They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing. . . . .”.
 The allies of the President passed a Resolution for Congressman X to substantiate his charges, and if he cannot do so, he shall be suspended from the House.
Congressman X did not substantiate the charges against the President of the Philippines. By a vote of 2/3 of the House, Congressman X was suspended for fifteen months for reason of “disorderly behavior”.
Arguing that the House has committed grave abuse of discretion, Congressman X went to the Supreme Court on Certiorari, contending that (1) the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (2) that his speech constituted no disorderly behavior for which he could be punished; and  (3) that the House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
Rule on the three contentions of Congressman X.

ANSWER (1) it is true that under the constitution he enjoys parliamentary immunity. He cannot be held liable for his speech in Congress while it is in session. (2) However if he is declared having a disorderly behavior, this matter belongs to Congress alone based on its internal rules, which becomes then a political question, and hence beyond the scope of the power of judicial review of the SC, OTHERWISE, there will be undue interference, amounting to the violation of the principle of separation of powers.  (3) Definitely, it is within the power of Congress to discipline or suspend any of its members.
 SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner, vs.SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59, respondents. EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17144 ,October 28, 1960

16. The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel.  Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement.  Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.
Questions: (1) Is said constitutional provision a self-executing one? Explain. (2) Does the 51% shares therein form part of the patrimony of the nation? Explain.

ANSWER:The Supreme Court ruled that this provision is self-executing. Though late in Tanada v. Tuvera, it said that this is only an exception to the rule, because the general rule is that the provision on Declaration of Principles and State Polices are merely guidelines of the other departments.
 (MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents. EN BANC[G.R. No. 122156.  February 3, 1997])
17. Given the PROPOSITION:  “DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?”

Questions: (1) Is this a proposal to amend the constitution?  Or a proposal to revise the constitution? Explain. (2) In what ways can the constitution be REVISED? (3) Can the above proposition be “directly proposed by the people through initiative”? (4) What are the  two essential elements that must be present for such a proposal?

ANSWERL1) In Lambino, the SC ruled that practically the proposal offers a qualitative overhaul of the government, and thus this would tantamount to a REVISION of the Constitution, and not merely an amendment. There are only two ways to a proposal for Revision: constitutional convention and constituent assembly. The people’s initiative applies only to amendment. Hence, the above proposition cannot therefore be directly proposed to the people through initiative. (4)First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal.  No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.  Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
( Lambino v. Comelec G.R. 174153 October 25, 2006)

18. Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under Executive Order No. 903, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the Manila International Airport Authority ("MIAA Charter"). Executive Order No. 903 was issued on 21 July 1983 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Subsequently, Executive Order Nos. 9091 and 2982 amended the MIAA Charter.
As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land,3 including the runways and buildings ("Airport Lands and Buildings") then under the Bureau of Air Transportation.4 The MIAA Charter further provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.5
On 21 March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061. The OGCC opined that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA negotiated with respondent City of Parañaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax already due.
Questions: (1) Is the Opinion of the OGCC correct? (2)  What is the nature of the MIAA? Is it a government owned or controlled corporation?(4) Is it subject to the real property tax of the City of Paranaque? (5) Is there an exception to its taxability or non-taxability? Explain your answer.
ANSWER: MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines a government "instrumentality" as follows:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. –– x x x x
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain,12 police authority13 and the levying of fees and charges.14 At the same time, MIAA exercises "all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order."15
Likewise, when the law makes a government instrumentality operationally autonomous, the instrumentality remains part of the National Government machinery although not integrated with the department framework. The MIAA Charter expressly states that transforming MIAA into a "separate and autonomous body"16 will make its operation more "financially viable."17
X x x
Under Section 2(10) and (13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code, which governs the legal relation and status of government units, agencies and offices within the entire government machinery, MIAA is a government instrumentality and not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code, MIAA as a government instrumentality is not a taxable person because it is not subject to "[t]axes, fees or charges of any kind" by local governments. The only exception is when MIAA leases its real property to a "taxable person" as provided in Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, in which case the specific real property leased becomes subject to real estate tax. Thus, only portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings leased to taxable persons like private parties are subject to real estate tax by the City of Parañaque.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, being devoted to public use, are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. Article 420 specifically mentions "ports x x x constructed by the State," which includes public airports and seaports, as properties of public dominion and owned by the Republic. As properties of public dominion owned by the Republic, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Airport Lands and Buildings are expressly exempt from real estate tax under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code. This Court has also repeatedly ruled that properties of public dominion are not subject to execution or foreclosure sale.(MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF PARAÑAQUE, CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD NG PARAÑAQUE, CITY ASSESSOR OF PARAÑAQUE, and CITY TREASURER OF PARAÑAQUE, EN BANC G.R. No. 155650  July 20, 2006)
19. On January 27, 1985 at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a private practitioner who charged therefor P14,000.00.
          As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, a complaint — which was, subsequently, amended — for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. As stated in the decision of the trial court.
The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading:
          The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
          or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
          Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
          Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
QUESTIONS: (1) Is the contention of Manila correct? (2) Is the City of Manila liable for damages? Explain.
ANSWER: (1) Manila’s contention is not correct. (2) It is therefore liable for damages. As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the answer of the City. Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition of a street which is "under the supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.
          Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made, for the first time, in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had not been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much less after the rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof.
          At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:
          Sec. 18. Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:
x x x           x x x           x x x
          (x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out, construction and improvement, and to regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public places; to provide for lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and public places; . . . to provide for the inspection of, fix the license fees for and regulate the openings in the same for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes, the building and repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures in and under the same and the erecting of poles and the stringing of wires therein; to provide for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales upon the streets and other public places; to provide for the abatement of nuisances in the same and punish the authors or owners thereof; to provide for the construction and maintenance, and regulate the use, of bridges, viaducts and culverts; to prohibit and regulate ball playing, kite-flying, hoop rolling, and other amusements which may annoy persons using the streets and public places, or frighten horses or other animals; to regulate the speed of horses and other animals, motor and other vehicles, cars, and locomotives within the limits of the city; to regulate the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . . to provide for and change the location, grade, and crossing of railroads, and compel any such railroad to raise or lower its tracks to conform to such provisions or changes; and to require railroad companies to fence their property, or any part thereof, to provide suitable protection against injury to persons or property, and to construct and repair ditches, drains, sewers, and culverts along and under their tracks, so that the natural drainage of the streets and adjacent property shall not be obstructed.
          This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs the disposition or appropriation of the highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and municipalities in the construction of roads and streets within their respective boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917, concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highway funds. Moreover, it provides that "the construction, maintenance and improvement of national primary, national secondary and national aid provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in annual or special appropriation Acts."
CITY OF MANILA, petitioner, vs.GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. EN BANCG.R. No. L-23052   January 29, 1968

20. . (a)The general rule is that Courts shy away from deciding cases which have become moot and academic. State the four exceptions to this rule
(b) For Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators to be accorded standing to sue, what requirements must be met?

ANSWER:(a)The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;31 second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;32 third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;33 and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.34
(b) Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators (PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners, vs.GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents. G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006)




















SAMPLE QUESTIONS




(1) What is a special agent for purposes of immunity of state from suit?
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)

2. The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for
 (1)"discrimination against males or females;"  that it
 (2) "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" 3 and that
 (3) it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise
(4) to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." 4 Department Order No. 1,
(5)it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.
Rule on the FIVE (5)different contentions of PASEI.

ANSWER: PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents.
EN BANC  G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988

3. Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the present state of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:
Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Incumbent Elected Official. – Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act,17 which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code18 and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are running,19 an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position without forfeiting his seat.
QUESTION: Are these provisions constitutional? How did the Supreme Court rule on these provisions? Explain.

Answer:
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010


4. Congress passed the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA), imposing the Universal Charge imposed upon the consumers. The assailed provision of law reads:

SECTION 34. Universal Charge. — Within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, a universal charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users for the following purposes:

(a)   Payment for the stranded debts in excess of the amount assumed by the National Government and stranded contract costs of NPC and as well as qualified stranded contract costs of distribution utilities resulting from the restructuring of the industry;
(b)   Missionary electrification;  
(c)   The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to indigenous or renewable sources of energy vis-à-vis imported energy fuels; 
(d)  An environmental charge equivalent to one-fourth of one centavo per kilowatt-hour (P0.0025/kWh), which shall accrue to an environmental fund to be used solely for watershed rehabilitation and management. Said fund shall be managed by NPC under existing arrangements; and 
(e)  A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a period not exceeding three (3) years.

The universal charge shall be a non-bypassable charge which shall be passed on and collected from all end-users on a monthly basis by the distribution utilities. Collections by the distribution utilities and the TRANSCO in any given month shall be remitted to the PSALM Corp. on or before the fifteenth (15th) of the succeeding month, net of any amount due to the distribution utility. Any end-user or self-generating entity not connected to a distribution utility shall remit its corresponding universal charge directly to the TRANSCO.  The PSALM Corp., as administrator of the fund, shall create a Special Trust Fund which shall be disbursed only for the purposes specified herein in an open and transparent manner.          Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which sought to implement the same are unconstitutional on the ground that the universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and sought to be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected from all electric end-users and self-generating entities. The power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation of said power to any executive or administrative agency like the ERC(Energy Regulatory Commission) is unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited authority. The assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative authority.
QUESTIONS:
 1)   Is the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax?

2)    Is there undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC?

ANSWER: Gerochi v. Dept of Energy, GR No. 159796, July 17, 2007

5. In a speech delivered before the House of Representatives, Congressman X,  said: “The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your unpopular administration the free things they used to get from the government are now for sale at premium prices. They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing. . . . .”.
 The allies of the President passed a Resolution for Congressman X to substantiate his charges, and if he cannot do so, he shall be suspended from the House.
Congressman X did not substantiate the charges against the President of the Philippines. By a vote of 2/3 of the House, Congressman X was suspended for fifteen months for reason of “disorderly behavior”.
Arguing that the House has committed grave abuse of discretion, Congressman X went to the Supreme Court on Certiorari, contending that (1) the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (2) that his speech constituted no disorderly behavior for which he could be punished; and  (3) that the House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
Rule on the three contentions of Congressman X.

ANSWER: SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner, vs.SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59, respondents. EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17144 ,October 28, 1960

6. Petitioner Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., Presiding Judge of Branch 253 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated August 22, 1997 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated December 22, 1997 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.
On May 23, 1997, respondent Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a Criminal Complaint1 for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of complainant’s eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority. Respondent alleged therein that on May 20, 1997, at the hallway on the third floor of the Hall of Justice, Las Pinas City, he requested petitioner to return the executive table he borrowed from respondent; that petitioner did not answer so respondent reiterated his request but before he could finish talking, petitioner blurted "Tarantado ito ah," and boxed him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was thrown away, rendering his eyeglasses unserviceable; and that respondent had the incident blottered with the Las Piñas Police Station. He prayed that criminal charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner.
On June 13, 1997, respondent Judge lodged another Complaint2 against petitioner, this time and administrative case with the Supreme Court, docketed as Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ, praying for the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer. Said complaint is based on the same facts as those in the complaint filed earlier with the office of the Ombudsman.
In the Order3 dated June 25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed on July 7, 1997 and "Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court,"4 praying that the Office of the Ombudsman hold its investigation of Case No. OMB-0-97-0903 in abeyance, and refer the same to the Supreme Court which, through the Office of the Court Administrator, is already investigating what transpired on May 20, 1997. Petitioner contended that the Supreme Court, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has the authority to make a preliminary determination of the respective culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge who, both being members of the bench, are under its exclusive supervision and control.
Rule on the Contention of the Petitioner.

ANSWER: JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN and JUDGE FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, respondents. SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 132177      July 19, 2001


7. Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under Philippine laws.  They are both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals.
On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines.  The LOI provides:

            The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer pricing formula a capital contribution component of not less than P10 per bag.  This capital contribution shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable.  Such capital contribution shall be applied by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in the Philippines.  (Underscoring supplied)
Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA).  FPA then remitted the amount collected to the Far East Bank and Trust Company, the depositary bank of PPI.  Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from July 8, 1985 to January 24, 1986.
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy.  With the return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but PPI refused to accede to the demand.
Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC in Makati.  It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of law.  Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry.
Questions: (1) Is the contention of Fertiphil that LOI No. 1465 is unconstitutional, correct? (2) Granting that it is unconstitutional can it be reimbursed the amount that it paid to PPI? (3) What constitutional principle is used by the Supreme Court in resolving these issues? Explain your answer.

ANSWER:  Planter’s Products v. Fertiphil Corporation,3rd Division,G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008


8. In an attempt by Senate to conduct another Senate Inquiry about the HELLO GARCI tapes, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with the Supreme  Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the “illegally obtained” wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose.  He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings.
On the other hand, the Senate also summoned On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.
 On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275.
 It may be noted that while both petitions involve the “Hello Garci” recordings, they have different objectives—the first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
Questions: (1) Can the Senate be prohibited from playing the Garci tapes? Explain. (2) Will Major Sagge be compelled to appear and testify before said Body? Explain.(3) Is Senate a continuing body or not? Explain. (4) Is the publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, sufficient compliance with due process? Explain.

ANSWER: Garcillano v. H Of R, GR 170338; Ranada v. Senate, 12/23/2008


9. The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel.  Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement.  Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.
Questions: (1) Is said constitutional provision a self-executing one? Explain. (2) Does the 51% shares therein form part of the patrimony of the nation? Explain.

ANSWER: MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents. EN BANC[G.R. No. 122156.  February 3, 1997]

10. Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. Is the Supreme Court, as the highest court of the land controlled by Stare Decisis? Explain your answer.

Answer: The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification. The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament. But ours is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability.
 For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division. De Castro v. JBC En Banc,GR 191002 April 20, 2010

11.  Given the PROPOSITION:  “DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?”

Questions: (1) Is this a proposal to amend the constitution?  Or a proposal to revise the constitution? Explain. (2) In what ways can the constitution be REVISED? (3) Can the above proposition be “directly proposed by the people through initiative”? (4) What are the  two essential elements that must be present for such a proposal?

ANSWER: Lambino v. Comelec G.R. 174153 October 25, 2006
First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal.  No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.  Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.


12. The constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
x x x x
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
x x x x
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

QUESTIONS: (1) State whether the each of the provisions therein are constitutional or not? Explain thoroughly keeping in mind the underlined personalities concerned.

ANSWER: Pimentel v. COMELEC En Banc,G.R. No. 161658,November 3, 2008

13. The case of Tanada v . Angara mentions the following terms: (a) "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation (b) A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture. Explain the two terms and cite at least two examples.

Answer: Tanada v. Angara, En Banc G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
 (a)Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented to restrict its sovereign rights under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation." 47-A Under Article 2 of the UN Charter, "(a)ll members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action." Such assistance includes payment of its corresponding share not merely in administrative expenses but also in expenditures for the peace-keeping operations of the organization. In its advisory opinion of July 20, 1961, the International Court of Justice held that money used by the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the Congo were "expenses of the United Nations" under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. Hence, all its members must bear their corresponding share in such expenses. In this sense, the Philippine Congress is restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled to appropriate funds whether it agrees with such peace-keeping expenses or not. So too, under Article 105 of the said Charter, the UN and its representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, thereby limiting again the exercise of sovereignty of members within their own territory.

(b)A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture, is an instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference." 54 It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference which may have taken place over several years.

14. Before the Supreme Court  is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) praying for the declaration of nullity of Executive Order (EO) 46, s. 2001 and the prohibition of herein respondents Office of the Executive Secretary and Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) from implementing the subject EO.
Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development License No. SB-01-085, is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. It claims to be a federation of national Islamic organizations and an active member of international organizations such as the Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP)1 and The World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal2 certifications in the Philippines. Thus, among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers.
Petitioner alleges that, on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and procedures based on the Qur'an3 and the Sunnah4 for the analysis of food, inspection thereof and issuance of halal certifications. In that same year, petitioner began to issue, for a fee, certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers. Petitioner even adopted for use on its halal certificates a distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine Patent Office under Patent No. 4-2000-03664.
On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 465 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.
On May 8, 2002, a news article entitled "OMA Warns NGOs Issuing Illegal 'Halal' Certification" was published in the Manila Bulletin, a newspaper of general circulation. In said article, OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy only products with its official halal certification since those without said certification had not been subjected to careful analysis and therefore could contain pork or its derivatives. Respondent OMA also sent letters to food manufacturers asking them to secure the halal certification only from OMA lest they violate EO 46 and RA 4109.6 As a result, petitioner lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it.
Hence, this petition for prohibition.
Petitioner contends that the subject EO (1) violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.7 It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. According to petitioner, a food product becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer. Thus, only practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food. A government agency like herein respondent OMA cannot therefore perform a religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal.
Petitioner also maintains that the respondents (2)violated Section 10, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "(n)o law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be passed." After the subject EO was implemented, food manufacturers with existing contracts with petitioner ceased to obtain certifications from the latter.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the subject EO (3)violates Sections 15 and 16 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution which respectively provide:
Sec. 15. The State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.
People's organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure.
Sec. 16. The rights of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate, the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.
According to petitioner, the subject EO was issued with utter haste and without even consulting Muslim people's organizations like petitioner before it became effective.

QUESTIONS: Rule on the three contentions of petitioner.
ANSWER: ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., herein represented by PROF. ABDULRAFIH H. SAYEDY, petitioner,
vs.OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the Office of the President of the Philippines, herein represented by HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, and the OFFICE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS, herein represented by its Executive Director, HABIB MUJAHAB HASHIM, respondents. G.R. No. 153888 July 9, 2003


15. Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. Explain this basic principle. What are its dual capacities? What are its twofold functions?

ANSWER: Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental. Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power." (MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner
vs.HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIÑA, IAUREANO BANIÑA, JR., SOR MARIETA BANIÑA, MONTANO BANIÑA, ORJA BANIÑA, AND LYDIA R. BANIÑA, respondents.
FIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. L-52179 April 8, 1991)

16. Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under Executive Order No. 903, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the Manila International Airport Authority ("MIAA Charter"). Executive Order No. 903 was issued on 21 July 1983 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Subsequently, Executive Order Nos. 9091 and 2982 amended the MIAA Charter.
As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land,3 including the runways and buildings ("Airport Lands and Buildings") then under the Bureau of Air Transportation.4 The MIAA Charter further provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.5
On 21 March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061. The OGCC opined that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA negotiated with respondent City of Parañaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax already due.
Questions: (1) Is the Opinion of the OGCC correct? (2)  What is the nature of the MIAA? Is it a government owned or controlled corporation?(4) Is it subject to the real property tax of the City of Paranaque? (5) Is there an exception to its taxability or non-taxability? Explain your answer.
ANSWER: MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines a government "instrumentality" as follows:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. –– x x x x
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain,12 police authority13 and the levying of fees and charges.14 At the same time, MIAA exercises "all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order."15
Likewise, when the law makes a government instrumentality operationally autonomous, the instrumentality remains part of the National Government machinery although not integrated with the department framework. The MIAA Charter expressly states that transforming MIAA into a "separate and autonomous body"16 will make its operation more "financially viable."17
X x x
Under Section 2(10) and (13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code, which governs the legal relation and status of government units, agencies and offices within the entire government machinery, MIAA is a government instrumentality and not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code, MIAA as a government instrumentality is not a taxable person because it is not subject to "[t]axes, fees or charges of any kind" by local governments. The only exception is when MIAA leases its real property to a "taxable person" as provided in Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, in which case the specific real property leased becomes subject to real estate tax. Thus, only portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings leased to taxable persons like private parties are subject to real estate tax by the City of Parañaque.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, being devoted to public use, are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. Article 420 specifically mentions "ports x x x constructed by the State," which includes public airports and seaports, as properties of public dominion and owned by the Republic. As properties of public dominion owned by the Republic, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Airport Lands and Buildings are expressly exempt from real estate tax under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code. This Court has also repeatedly ruled that properties of public dominion are not subject to execution or foreclosure sale.(MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF PARAÑAQUE, CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD NG PARAÑAQUE, CITY ASSESSOR OF PARAÑAQUE, and CITY TREASURER OF PARAÑAQUE, EN BANC G.R. No. 155650  July 20, 2006)

17. On January 27, 1985 at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a private practitioner who charged therefor P14,000.00.
          As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, a complaint — which was, subsequently, amended — for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. As stated in the decision of the trial court.
The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading:
          The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
          or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
          Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
          Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
QUESTIONS: (1) Is the contention of Manila correct? (2) Is the City of Manila liable for damages? Explain.
ANSWER: CITY OF MANILA, petitioner, vs.GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. EN BANCG.R. No. L-23052   January 29, 1968
18. (a)The general rule is that Courts shy away from deciding cases which have become moot and academic. State the four exceptions to this rule
(b) For Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators to be accorded standing to sue, what requirements must be met?

ANSWER:(a)The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;31 second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;32 third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;33 and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.34
(b) Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators (PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners, vs.GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents. G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006)

19. Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War. 

Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages and systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of the village. Their communities were bombed, houses were looted and burned, and civilians were publicly tortured, mutilated, and slaughtered. Japanese soldiers forcibly seized the women and held them in houses or cells, where they were repeatedly raped, beaten, and abused by Japanese soldiers. As a result of the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and mental and emotional suffering. 
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines.  However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Issues

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.
(1)Decide on the above issues.
(2) IS the Philippines  under any international obligation to espouse petitioners’ claim?
(3) Define Jus cogens and erga omnes. How are these principles invoked in this case?
(4)    Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the Peace Treaty of 1951.In essence what is this Peace Treaty all about?

Answer: VINUYA V. ROMULO, GR NO. en banc162230,April 28, 2010 

20. It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that in August of 1996, intelligence operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the area.  They learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks.
On October 19, 1996, at about 10 o’clock in the evening, Chief Inspector Benjamin Arceo, Tarlac Police Chief, held a briefing in connection with a tip which his office received that the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be making a delivery that night.  An hour later, the Police Alert Team installed a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan to apprehend the suspects.  Witness SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, PO3 Florante Ferrer and SPO3 Roberto Aquino were assigned to man the checkpoint.
At about 1:00 o’clock in the morning of the following day, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle.  It had two female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as the appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga. In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the two’s uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan Center No.2 located at the same barangay.  They brought with them the black bag.
Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain Roy Pascual to witness the opening of the black bag. In the meantime, the two women and the bag were turned over to the investigator on duty, SPO3 Arthur Antonio.  As soon as the barangay captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence of the appellant, her co-accused and personnel of the center.  Found inside it were eight bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper.  The leaves were suspected to be marijuana.
To determine who owns the bag and its contents, SPO3 Antonio interrogated the two.  Rosita Nunga stated that it was owned by the appellant.  The latter, in turn, disputed this allegation.  Thereafter, they were made to sign a confiscation receipt without the assistance of any counsel, as they were not informed of their right to have one.  During the course of the investigation, not even close relatives of theirs were present.
The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, Pampanga on October 23, 1996. Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu conducted a laboratory examination on them. She concluded that the articles were marijuana leaves weighing eight kilos.
For their part, both accused denied the accusation against them.  Rosita Nunga testified that in the evening of October 19,1996, she went to buy medicine for her ailing child at a pharmacy near the Tarlac Provincial Hospital.  The child was suffering from diarrhea, occasioned by abdominal pain.  To return to their house, she boarded a tricycle bound for Barangay Tariji, where she resides. Along the way, the tricycle she was riding was flagged down by a policeman at a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan.  She was taken aback when the officer invited her to the Kabayan Center.  It was there that she was confronted with the black bag allegedly containing eight bricks of marijuana leaves.  She disputed owning the bag and knowing its contents.  She also denied sitting beside the appellant in the passenger’s seat inside the tricycle, although she admitted noticing a male passenger behind the driver.
The accused raised the following defenses:
(1)   In arguing that her arrest was unlawful, appellant capitalizes on the absence of a warrant for her arrest.  She contends that at the time she was apprehended by the police officers, she was not committing any offense but was merely riding a tricycle.  In the same manner, she impugns the search made on her belongings as illegal as it was done without a valid warrant or under circumstances when warrantless search is permissible.  Consequently, any evidence obtained therein is inadmissible against her.
(2)Appellant also takes issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a lawyer when police officers interrogated her.  She claimed that she was not duly informed of her right to remain silent and to have competent counsel of her choice.  Hence, she argues that the confession or admission obtained therein should be considered inadmissible in evidence against her.
(3Appellant then faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account the object and documentary evidence of the prosecution despite the latter’s failure to formally offer them.  Absent any formal offer, she argues that they again must be deemed inadmissible

Rule on the contentions of appellant. 
ANSWER: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y VALENCIA, accused. THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 136860.  January 20, 2003]